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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS BY STATE PRISONERS
Rodriguez v. McGinnis
That a prisoner retains certain basic constitutional rights is now
considered a well-settled proposition. 0 No such clarity, however, is
obtained in analyzing the remedies available to enforce such rights.
The multiplicity51 of opinions expressed by the court en banc52 in
Rodriguez v. McGinnis5 3 is demonstrative of the conflicting viewpoints
and policies involved in this question. In reversing two prior judg-
ments,5" the Second Circuit, under the authority55 of Wilwording v.
60 As early as 1894, the Supreme Court agreed that prisoners may sue to enforce cer-
tain basic rights. In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242 (1894). A prisoner, it has been said, "retains
all the rights of an ordinary citizen except those expressly, or by necessary implication,
taken from him by law." Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied,
325 U.S. 887 (1945). For Second Circuit commentary on this doctrine, see Sostre v. McGinnis,
442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1970); Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519, 522 (2d Cir. 1967). Chief
Judge Foley, in Rodriguez v. McGinnis, 307 F. Supp. 627 (N.D.N.Y. 1969), (the initial
opinion for the case discussed herein) considered this in some detail. Id. at 628. He con-
cluded that the "hands-off" doctrine with respect to the rights of prisoners and internal
prison administration retained little if any vitality. "It is settled . . . that the due process
and equal protection processes of the fourteenth amendment follow prisoners into prison."
Id. Rights of personal bodily security, access to the courts, and the first amendment free-
doms are those rights most often considered in this context. Note, 42 U.S.C. 1983 -An
Emerging Vehicle of Post-Conviction Relief for State Prisoners, 22 U. FLA. L. REv. 596
(1970).
51 A total of eight different opinions were written with seven concurring in the result
and one dissenting. Rodriguez v. McGinnis, 456 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1972).
52 The court en banc consisted of "the judges who should be in active service on the
date of decisions along with members of the respective panels who had since taken senior
status . .." Id. at 80. As a result, the case was heard by twelve judges: Chief Judge Friendly
and Circuit Judges Lumbard, Waterman, Moore, Smith, Kaufman, Hays, Feinberg, Mans-
field, Mulligan, Oakes and Timbers.
53 456 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1972).
54 The case was a consolidation of three individual cases all raising the same legal
issue. In the first case, the United States District Court for the Northern District of New
York directed the release of a state prisoner because of an unconstitutional deprivation of
good behavior time. Rodriguez v. McGinnis, 307 F. Supp. 627 (N.D.N.Y. 1969). This de-
cision was reversed by the court of appeals. 451 F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1971). In the second case,
the United States District Court for the Northern District granted the same relief by an
order dated August 18, 1970. Again the court of appeals reversed, United States ex rel.
Katzoff v. McGinnis, 441 F.2d 558 (2d Cir. 1971). Finally, the United States District Court
for the Northern District, by an order dated June 12, 1970, granted the same relief to a
third prisoner, John Kritsky. The court of appeals, by an order dated July 19, 1971, con-
solidated the three cases for this en banc proceeding. 456 F.2d at 79.
55 It is at least uncertain whether, without the authority of Wilwording (see note 56
infra), the Second Circuit would have so decided Rodriguez. The opinions of Judges
Friendly, Mulligan and Mansfield expressly stated that Wilwording constrained their hold-
ing. It can safely be assumed that, absent Wilwording, they would have joined the three
dissenting judges. Judges Feinberg and Kaufman relied on Wilwording but, as Judge Kauf-
man indicated, did "not construe Wilwording as a ground breaking decision." 456 F.2d at
82. This apparently approximates the viewpoint of Judge Timbers, who concurred with
Judges Smith, Feinberg and Kaufman. Judges Waterman and Smith who had dissented in
the previous cases (451 F.2d 730, 733; 441 F.2d 558, 560) and Judge Oakes, who stated that
he agreed with their reasoning, did not actually rely on Wilwording.
[Vol. 47:250
SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE
Swenson, " held that, even though the relief granted under section 1983
of the Civil Rights Act57 would result in the prisoners' release, the
court would not consider the petition as one of habeas corpus5s "with
its attendant requirement of exhaustion of state remedies when these
are available .... ,9 Accordingly, the court refused to deny relief for
failure to comply with exhaustion requirements.
In all three cases60 before the court, the lower court declared that
the petitioners had been unconstitutionally deprived61 of good be-
56 404 U.S. 249 (1971). In Wilwording, the petitioners challenged the living conditions
and disciplinary measures of the maximum security section of the Missouri State Peniten-
tiary. The relief sought was federal habeas corpus. This relief was denied by the district
court, 331 F. Supp. 1188, 1194 (W.D. Mo. 1969) and by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit, 439 F.2d 1331, 1336 (8th Cir. 1971). The ratio decidendi for those denials was that,
although the petitioners had exhausted state habeas corpus remedies, they had not invoked
a number of possible alternative remedies and had thus not satisfied the exhaustion re-
requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1971). The Supreme Court held that such alternative
remedies need not be resorted to, particularly in view of the fact that there is no
evidence that "Missouri courts have [ever] granted a hearing to state prisoners on the
conditions of their confinement." 404 U.S. at 250. More importantly, foreshadowing the
issue in Rodriguez, the Supreme Court reasoned that "although cognizable in federal
habeas corpus.., petitioners' pleading may also be read to plead causes of action under
the [federal] Civil Rights Acts ... for deprivation of constitutional rights by prison offi-
cials." Id. at 251. The Court went on to hold that the state prisoners could have their
actions treated as claims under the federal Civil Rights Acts and, if so treated, they would
not be subject to exhaustion requirements. Id. at 251.
5742 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
Civil action for deprivation of rights.
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action of law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
See also 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1962). This act was passed by a reconstruction Congress in
1871 to enforce the fourteenth amendment at the expense of state power and independence.
Note, § 1983: A Civil Remedy for the Protection of Federal Rights, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 839
(1964). The purpose of the statute is extensively considered in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167 (1961) and McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963). It is ". . . severalfold- to
override certain kinds of state laws, to provide a remedy where state law was inadequate,
'to provide a federal remedy where the state remedy, though adequate in theory was not
available in practice'.. . and to provide a remedy in the federal courts supplementary to
any remedy any State might have." Id. at 671-72. Interestingly, despite its present attrac-
tiveness, § 1983 was invoked no more than 21 times in the first 50 years of its existence.
Note, Federal-State Relations and Section 1983, 24 S.C.L. REV. 101 (1972).
58 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1971).
59 456 F.2d at 81. The exhaustion requirement and the philosophy of federal judicial
restraint that it embodies dates back to Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886). The exhaus-
tion of state remedies prior to federal habeas corpus relief is directly mandated by statute
-28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1971).
60 See note 54 supra.
61 In the case of Rodriguez, who was found in possession of contraband photos, the
district court found that the cancellation of his 120 days of good behavior time was the
result of his failure to reveal the method of smuggling and the identities of those who had
assisted him. Upon making this determination, the court found a deprivation of his right
to due process since there was no institutional rule punishing refusal to inform, and ap-
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havior time.62 The petitioners had brought federal civil rights actions
based on the alleged unconstitutionality and, in each case, the district
court restored the good behavior time at issue.63 Since the restored time
was in excess of the balance of their sentences, petitioners were entitled
to immediate release.6 4 The court of appeals initially reversed 65 but
subsequently, sitting en banc, affirmed the district court judgments.66
Perhaps even more than the variety of opinions, 17 the fact that
three judges could consider Wilwording sufficiently in point to concur
solely on the basis of that decision 8 while three others69 could dissent
in the face of it, offers evidence of the turmoil and conflict that this
propriate procedural safeguards had not been satisfied. 307 F. Supp. at 632. The court of
appeals reversed, holding that petitioners had failed to exhaust state remedies, and de-
dined to answer the constitutional question involved. 451 F.2d at 731. In the third case,
the petitioner, John Kritsky, complained of an "unconstitutional deprivation of good time
because of his participation in an inmate strike .... " 456 F.2d at 85. Katzoff, the petitioner
in the second case, lost good behavior time because of offensive remarks concerning a
deputy commissioner and two nurses. Katzoff's remarks were recorded in his diary, kept
with the knowledge and consent of prison officials. 441 F.2d at 559. The court of appeals
did not reach the constitutional claims, but reversed strictly on a failure to exhaust state
remedies. As a result, it seems that the issues before the court en banc are most precisely
framed in Katzoff.
62 Prisoners serving indeterminate sentences can earn good behavior time at the rate
of up to ten days per month. Theoretically, a prisoner could be released after serving but
two-thirds of his maximum sentence. Earned good behavior time may properly be revoked
for disciplinary reasons. N.Y. COP.ECrON LAW § 803 (McKinney 1969); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§§ 70.30 4(a), 70.40 l(a)(b) (McKinney 1967). See 441 F.2d at 559; 451 F.2d at 731.
63 Restoring good behavior time reduced the petitioners' period of incarceration by
the number of days involved. In these cases, because of the short time remaining on each
petitioner's sentence, restoration in each case required release. Release from custody is
generally the remedy sought in habeas corpus proceedings. See, e.g., Johnson v. Avery, 393
U.S. 483 (1969); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). However, custody is a broad concept
and it has been held that one who is on parole is under sufficient restraint to entitle him
to bring habeas corpus. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963). Although habeas corpus
does "enable those unlawfully incarcerated to obtain their freedom" (393 U.S. at 485), its
basic purpose is "to test the legality of a prisoner's current detention." Walker v. Wain-
right, 390 U.S. 335, 336 (1968). It is, therefore, appropriate even if granting relief would
not entitle petitioner to immediate release as in a challenge to the validity of one of sev-
eral consecutive sentences. See Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968); Walker v. Wainright,
supra.
64 The district court in Rodriguez added that, if release was not granted within a
reasonable time, Rodriguez's attorney was to submit a writ of habeas corpus to achieve
such release. 307 F. Supp. at 632. See note 63 supra.
65451 F.2d at 731; 441 F.2d at 559.
66 See note 54 supra.
67 See note 51 supra.
68 Chief Judge Friendly, joined by Judges Mulligan and Mansfield, registered his dis-
agreement with the reasoning of Wilwording that permits a prisoner to escape the require-
ments of exhaustion "by styling his [habeas corpus) petition as one under the Civil Rights
Act." 456 F.2d at 81. Judge Mansfield wrote a separate opinion and also reasoned that
petitioners were actually bringing habeas corpus actions. However, it had been his view
before Wilwording that, in civil rights actions under these circumstances, petitioners
would be held to exhaustion requirements. Id. at 83.
69 Judge Lumbard, joined by Judges Hayes and Moore.
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case raised.70 Judge Lumbard's dissent, after distinguishing Wilwording
on the ground that no state remedies were available there,71 utilized
statistics to establish that, in light of the recent increase of the number
of section 1983 actions, 72 state courts are better equipped to hear such
complaints than are the overburdened federal courts.7 This argument
is attacked by the concurring opinions of Judge Feinberg74 and Judge
Oakes71 for attempting to judicially resolve questions reserved for the
legislative branch. 76 While Judge Lumbard argued for
70 The conflicts here go deeper than a mere question of procedure. The exhaustion
requirement has its roots in federal judicial restraint and the very nature of our federal
system. See Ex parte Royall, 117 US. 241 (1886). Cogent arguments can be advanced for
both sides on technical as well as broad policy grounds. It has generally been held that
§ 1983 is not appropriate where a specific federal remedy is available for the right involved.
See Note, § 1983: A Civil Remedy for the Protection of Federal Rights, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rlv.
839, 843 (1964). This general rule has been applied to § 1983 prison actions vis-A-vis habeas
corpus. Peinado v. Adult Authority, 405 F.2d 1185, (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
968 (1969); Johnson v. Walker, 317 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1963). However, as Judge Smith indi-
cates in his dissent in Katzoff, both Peinado and Johnson relate to an attack on the validity
of the sentence and could be so distinguished. 441 F.2d at 560. Absent this distinguishing
factor, the general rule prior to Wilwording would appear to bar the petitioners since
habeas corpus would have been a proper specific remedy. Wilwording removed that bar
but did not resolve the total issue. There are strong policy arguments for utilizing habeas
corpus and retaining the exhaustion requirement. Federal courts are loathe to disturb the
federal-state balance by intruding into internal state affairs. This reluctance is even greater
when the intrusion is into the internal administration of prisons, traditionally a function
of the executive branch. Therefore, separation of powers questions are also raised. Note,
42 U.S.C. 1983: An Emerging Vehicle of Post-Conviction Relief for State Prisoners, 22 U.
FLA. L. REv. 596 (1970).
73 Judge Lumbard reasoned that since New York did provide an adequate remedy
(NEW YoRK Crv RWris LAw § 79 (c) (McKinney 1968)), "there was still room to hold
that a district court in New York should refrain from hearing such a case until the
state court has acted. .. ." 456 F.2d at 85. In his view, Wilwording would be inapplicable
to the instant case since the Missouri courts did not provide such relief. See 404 U.S. at
250. This same theory was used to distinguish Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639 (1968)
(per curiam), i.e., no evidence was there presented that Pennsylvania provided an ade-
quate remedy.
72 456 F.2d at 86. Judge Mansfield also commented on the increase (170 per cent) in
the number of civil rights actions brought by prisoners. Id. at 84.
73Judge Lumbard noted that, since the New York Supreme Court now holds court
"within the confines of the prisons," the elimination of the exhaustion requirement "is
a clear invitation to state prisoners to frame complaints of alleged mistreatment so that
they will, at the least, be afforded some vacation from the tedium of prison life." 456
F.2d at 86. Judge Lumbard reasoned that, in light of the availability of the state courts,
it would be an unwarranted security risk and drain on prison resources to require the
transportation of complaining prisoners to distant federal courts.
This view finds support in Judge Mansfield's concurring opinion. Id. at 84.
74Id. at 83.
7 Id. at 84.
76 But this is almost a matter of perspective. Assuming arguendo that Judge Lumbard
is correct and Wilwording is distinguishable, then perhaps the majority is using "judicial
legislation" to eliminate the exhaustion requirement of habeas corpus by permitting the
§ 1983 action. However, it must be noted that the majority does not resort to statistics
and the policy balancing that they imply.
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a requirement of exhaustion of state remedies as a condition pre-
cedent to a cause of action in the federal courts under the Civil
Rights Act by a state prisoner seeking equitable relief from
allegedly unconstitutional prison conditions or sanctions97
Judges Friendly, Mulligan and Mansfield reasoned that petitioners
were merely disguising habeas corpus petitions within a section 1983
framework to escape such exhaustion requirements. 78
However, the majority79 of the court en banc considered the
exhaustion requirement inapplicable to section 1983 petitions and
reasoned that petitioners' actions were properly framed under that
statute. As indicated by Judge Kaufman's opinion, 0 the constitutional
claim raised here is unrelated to any prior proceeding or final state ad-
judication, making habeas corpus inappropriate.$' Judge J. Joseph
77 456 F.2d at 85. The requirement for exhaustion of administrative state remedies
in civil rights actions dies hard, despite the impressive list of Supreme Court precedents
holding that such exhaustion is not required. See note 91 infra. Judge Lumbard con-
sidered most of these Supreme Court precedents and noted that only Houghton and
Wilwording dealt with state prisons and that in Wilwording no state remedy was pro-
vided. He also noted that it did "not appear from the record what, if any, remedies were
available to Houghton . . ." in the state of Pennsylvania. 456 F.2d at 85.
The court in Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
841 (1970), in discussing the exhaustion requirements for civil rights actions prior to
Rodriguez, cited McNeese, Damico, Houghton, and Smith, (see note 91 infra) and dis-
missed them as "simply condemning a wooden application of the exhaustion doctrine"
in this area "[d]espite the breadth of some of the language" in these Supreme Court
opinions. 421 F.2d at 569. Although this does not represent the entire holding in Eisen,
such a narrow construction of the relevant Supreme Court precedents, even as dicta, is
indicative of the judicial attitude toward exhaustion under § 1983.
More recent evidence of the tenacity of the exhaustion requirement in civil rights
actions is Metcalf v. Swank, 444 F.2d 1353 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 406 U.S. 914
(1972). Here again, the court of appeals distinguished all of the relevant Supreme Court
cases and held exhaustion was still required under certain circumstances. The Supreme
Court subsequently vacated the judgment and "remanded the case for further considera-
tion in light of Carter v. Stanton (405 U.S. 669 (1972))." 406 U.S. at 914. In Carter,
the Court overturned a district court order dismissing the complaint of claimants who
were contesting an Indiana welfare regulation. The district court had dismissed
the complaint on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Court
concluded that it is established "that exhaustion is not required in circumstances such
as those presented here." 405 U.S. at 671.
The reluctance of the federal courts to circumvent the requirements of exhaustion
here can be attributed, at least in part, to the same policies that make exhaustion a
requisite for habeas corpus relief.
78 See note 68 supra.
79 The term majority is used loosely herein to indicate the six judges who readily con-
curred under Wilwording. It is actually more a plurality than a majority and not even
that in view of the five opinions written by the six judges. See notes 51, 52, 8- 55 supra.
80 Judge Kaufman's opinion is probably the closest to a majority or plurality opinion
as four judges formally concurred with it and Judge Feinberg indicated agreement with
the views expressed in it. 456 F.2d at 83.
81 Judge Kaufman analyzed the interaction of § 1983 and habeas corpus, noted their
different purposes, and concluded that "Wilwording will not lead to the subversion or
circumvention of the habeas corpus exhaustion requirement.. ." Id.
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Smith, referring to his dissent 2 in Katzoff,83 agreed that neither absten-
tion s4 nor exhaustion requirements "may bar a prisoner from his choice
of a federal forum in a civil rights action."8 Judge Smith also ques-
tioned attempts to "lighten [the courts'] burden by stifling or delaying
* . .,, such constitutional complaints by prisoners. Although such
"poorly prepared"87 complaints impose an "onerous burden",88 all too
often they allege true injustice and
[i]t would be far better to provide more assistance in the districts
which contain Attica and other large institutions giving rise to
these issues than to deny redress within the federal court system
for deprivation of civil rights.89
As Judge Smith quite properly indicated, there is a pressing need
for reform in this area and judicial intervention seems required.90 In
addition, the line of authority supporting the court's result is impres-
sive.91 When evaluated in the light of these considerations, the result
here is patently correct.92
82 Judge Waterman also concurred on the strength of his earlier dissent. See note 55
supra.
83 Katzoff v. McGinnis, 441 F.2d 558 (2d Cir. 1971). See note 61 supra for a summary
of the facts in Katzoff, one of the prior decisions being reevaluated in the instant case.
Judge Smith's dissent in Katzoff also noted that Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.
1971), has held that federal courts can restore good behavior time that is unconstitution-
ally cancelled. He concluded therefore that "[t]o make the availability of this remedy turn
on the fortuitousness of the prisoner's timing in filing his section 1983 claim makes no
sense in terms of either logic or judicial efficiency." 441 F.2d at 560.
84Abstention basically allows federal courts, before deciding the constitutional im-
plications of a state statute, to remand to the state courts for an authoritative construc-
tion. Thus, exhaustion sends the petitioner back to a state agency or court to resolve
whether he was deprived of a federal right while abstention sends the petitioner back
to a state court to interpret the meaning of the state statute. Note, § 1983: A Civil
Remedy for the Protection of Federal Rights, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 839, 856 (1964).
85 456 F.2d at 81.
s61d. at 81-82.
87 Id. at 82.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 See E. Spaeth, Jr., The Court's Responsibility for Prison Reform, 16 Vir.. L. Ray.
1031 (1971). For general commentary on prisoners rights, see Prisoner Rights and the
Correctional Scheme: The Legal Controversy and Problems of Implementation - A Sym-
posium, 16 ViLL. L. REv. 1029 (1971).
9iThe exhaustive opinion in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1963), coupled with
McNeese v. Bd. of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963), defined the basic purpose of § 1983. See note
57 supra. The theory enunciated in these cases was followed in Damico v. California,
389 U.S. 416 (1967) (per curiam) where the exhaustion of state administrative remedies
was held not required. The Court, in King v. Smith, 392 US. 309 (1968), also considered
the exhaustion of state administrative remedies as unnecessary. The doctrine was extended
to prisoner situations in Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639 (1968) (per curiam), holding
that a state prisoner in Pennsylvania need not resort to state administrative remedies.
The doctrine was again applied to prison situations in Wilwording. Since Wilwording,
the high court has again affirmed the doctrine in Carter v. Stanton, 405 U.S. 669 (1972)
(per curiam).
92 Some doubt is thrown on the validity of the Second Circuit's holding by the fact
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The court's decision represents a major step in the area of pri-
soner's rights beyond the fact that it provides an alternative federal
remedy to prisoners in certain special circumstances. 3 The import of
this case stems more from the fact that it hopefully portends94 a greater
judicial receptivity to the rapidly increasing use of section 1983 by
prisoners95 and thus helps guarantee their access to a federal tribunal to
protect their constitutional rights.
HABEAS CoRPus - EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES
United States ex rel. Nelson v. Zelker
A deluge of habeas corpus petitions filed by state prisoners has
caused serious concern among members of the federal judicary. Some
argue that the writ which, historically, has been held in high esteem as
the primary safeguard against unconstitutional deprivations of liberty,96
that, on June 19, 1972, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Oswald v. Rodriguez, 407
U.S. 919 (1972). This is somewhat surprising considering the unanimous opinion in
Wilwording. Perhaps the Supreme Court, realizing the difficulties encountered by the
Second Circuit herein and the tenacity of the exhaustion requirement in this area (see
note 77 supra), will attempt to finally settle the question by affirming the Second Circuit's
decision. This is, of course, speculation but the fact remains that the granting of cer-
tiorari does muddy the waters somewhat at a time when they were finally clearing.
Evidence that the Second Circuit is delaying application of the Rodriguez doctrine is
found in Ray v. Fritz, No. 72-1455, (2d Cir. October 19, 1972), where the court stated:
We would thus remand without further ado were it not for the grant of cer-
tiorari by the Supreme Court in Oswald v. Rodriguez, 407 U.S. 919 (1972),
decided by this court en bane sub nom. Rodriguez v. Mc Ginnis, 456 F.2d 79 (1972).
93 The specific holding here provides alternative modes of relief only to those prisoners
whose § 1983 actions are so timed that restoration of their good behavior time would
result in their release. This group then has the alternative remedies of habeas corpus
and § 1983.
94A significant limitation on the availability of § 1983 actions stems from the fact
that the section is not applicable where a specific federal remedy is available for the
right involved. See note 70 supra. After Wilwording and Rodriguez, the continued
viability of this restriction must be questioned. The exhaustion requirement for § 1983
also appears to be fading in light of the multitude of Supreme Court precedents holding
that exhaustion is not required. See note 91 supra. Elimination of these restrictions now
appears likely and would obviously permit freer use of § 1983 by prisoners. However, the
present situation within the Second Circuit remains in a state of flux pending Supreme
Court review of Rodriguez. Ray v. Fritz, No. 72-1455 (2d Cir. October 19, 1972).
9 5 1n 1966, 21 state prisoner civil rights suits were commenced within the Second
Circuit. By 1971, this number had increased to 585. 456 F.2d at 86.
96 The writ of habeas corpus is one of our greatest safeguards of liberty. As R. Sokol
says in A HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL HABEAS Cos'us (1965), "the function of the Great Writ
can be simply expressed. It is to test in a court of law the legality of restraints on a
person's liberty." Id. at 2. The power to grant a writ of federal habeas corpus is given
to the Supreme Court, the courts of appeals and the district courts by 28 US.C. § 2241
(1970). Thus, a state prisoner, even after conviction and an unsuccessful appeal through
the state court system, may raise issues of law and fact that can culminate in his dis-
charge from custody.
The section of the habeas corpus statute (28 U.S.C. § 2241 et seq.) that applies to
state prisoners is 28 U.S.C. § 2254 which provides that the writ may be granted "only
[Vol. 47:250
